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CASE NOTES

1''

would seem difficult to draw a line short of such absurdities if it were
held that a policeman has the public duty to prevent himself from violating the law and to detect his own infractions.

DAMAGES-CALCULATION OF "LOSS OF SUPPORT"
IN DEATH ACTION
A surviving widow sued under the Louisiana Civil Code for the wrongful death of her husband. After disposition of the question of liability in
favor of the plaintiff, the Supreme Court of Louisiana held that factors
to be considered in the calculation of damages, included, among other
things, (1)the divorce rate, (2) the percentage of remarriages of widows,
particularly to second husbands whose earnings are greater than those
of the first, and (3) the possible retirement of the deceased husband.
Brown v. Bourg & Sons, Inc., 239 La. 473, 118 So. 2d 891 (1960).
In the particular area of calculation of damages for "loss of support"
the law is quite clear, and all contra to the principal case. In the Brown
case defendant's truck was carrying a load of pipes at night which extended beyond the rear of the truck; there was no red light attached as
required by statute. The truck driver, without signal, stopped suddenly,
causing a taxi to run into the truck; the pipes smashed into the head of
the passenger in the taxi, resulting in his death. In the lower court it was
held that the truck driver was negligent, entitling the widow to recover
for damages. The trial court then went into the problem of calculation
of damages. "The decedent was 52 years old .. .his life expectancy was
19.49 years. For the purpose of computation we can consider this figure
to be 20 years ...[I]t is safe to conclude that he had been providing
about $500.00 per year for her support. . . ."' This means that the anticipated contribution was $10,000.00. To this, the trial court added
$2,000.00 for love and affection, and $800.00 for the cost of the funeral.
Thus, the widow was awarded $12,800.00. This was "standard operating
procedure," and the manner in which courts have always computed damages in such cases. However, upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Louisiana said that the lower court was in error. The "loss of support" was not
to be computed merely by multiplying the average contribution of decedent by the number of years of life expectancy. The court stated
tersely:
There are ... other factors to be taken into consideration. The life expectancy

of the survivor, the divorce rate, the percentage of remarriagesof widows, particularly to second husbands whose earnings are greater than those of the first,
1 Brown v. Bourg & Sons, Inc., 239 La. 473, 118 So. 2d 891, 895 (1960).
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the condition of health of the decedent, his possible retirement, the possibility
of an increase or decrease in his annual earnings, and the change in value of the
dollar over a 2long period of years are among other factors to be takcn into
consideration.
The award was then reduced to $8,7 31.00.
As far back as 1893 it was held not admissible to show that plaintiffs
and deceased were Negroes, for the purpose of reducing damages, on
the hypothesis that family ties are not strong with the Negro race.3 Insofar as damages are concerned "the reasonable expectation of the plaintiff
of benefits from [decedent]" 4 is the proper measure of the award.
In Consolidated Stone v. Morgan,5 the decedent was working near a
derrick, and because of the defendant's negligence in checking a guyrope, the derrick fell and killed the decedent. The defendant wanted to
have the jury instructed that as the decedent's widow had remarried, the
damages should be lessened. The court refused, saying that the remarriage
"should not be considered .. .in assessing the damages. . . .. Illinois has
held the same.7 Where plaintiff's intestate was employed by the defendant
to load coal from defendant's scow onto the steamer Petoskey, and while
so doing, intestate fell off and drowned, the defendant wanted to make
mention of the fact that the plaintiff remarried. In refusing the instruction, the Illinois Appellate Court held:
"

It is contended that the amount awarded as damages is excessive, and, in support of this contention, it is urged that the widow of the deceased has married
again, and has thus secured a new means of support, and that her present husband stand in loco parentis to the children. We think this view untenable. ....8
Yet, in the principal case, we are to consider such things as "the divorce
rate." Certainly, the direct conflict of theory is clearly visible.
By the great weight of authority, evidence showing that the surviving
spouse has remarried since the death complained of, is not to be considered in mitigation of the damages recoverable, and in fact, is inadmissible. 9 Nor does the fact that the widow remarries at any time during the
2

Id. at 895. (Emphasis added.)

3 Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Moody, 23 S.XV. 41 (Texas, 1893).

4 Id.at 42.

5Consolidated Stone v. Morgan, 160 Ind. 241, 66 N.E. 696 (1903).
6Id. at 247, 66 N.E. at 698, 699.
7 0.S.

Richardson Fueling Co. v. Peters, 82 Ill.
App. 508 (1898).

8 Id.at 512, 513. (Emphasis added.)
) St. Louis, I.M.&S.Ry. v. Cleere, 76 Ark. 377, 88 S.W. 995 (1905); Davis v. Springfield
Hospital, 204 Mo.App. 626, 218 S.W. 696 (1920); Lees v. New York Consol. R., 109 Misc.
608, 180 N.Y. Supp. 546 (1919).
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pendency of the suit alfct her right of recovery. 10 Aptly put, "The
pecuniary injury resulting to her from his death ... is to be measiired ...
unaffected by the fact that subsequently she may have entered into nIew
relations."" Further, Louisiana has stated that evidence is ina dmi sihle
to show that since her husband's death the widow has become engaged
to marry again.Y In Jones v. Kasas City So. Ry., the court held, in an
action for damages by a widow, that "evidence as to the engagement of
1
the plaintiff ... was irrelevant."' 3
In a suit under Louisiana's provision for wrongful death, 14 it has been
held that in a wrongful death action "there can be no exact rule for measurement of damages applicable to all cases, for the facts of each case
must be the basis upon which the amount of the award is predicated."' 5
In other words, there are no fixed rules for determining the amount of
16
damages.
There are certainly, however, basic areas to be considered in mitigation of the amount of award. Among these are included a study of the
purchasing power of the dollar,' 7 the defendant's ability to respond in
damages,' 8 and other peculiar circumstances. 19 Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, recovery is limited to pecuniary loss to beneficiaries, and in the computation a discount is made for lost future benefits at a fair rate at which money might be loaned or invested safely for
each year of life expectancy. 20
Just last year, it was held that an "acceptable formula for computation
of widow's recovery for loss of support, based upon average net earning
power of husband at time of his death, should be set forth as follows:
Annual Net Wage × Life Expectancy - Discount 'l

'

2
1('Archer v. Bowling, 166 Ky. 139, 179 S.V. 15 (1915).

11 Chicago, St.P., M.&O. Ry. v. Lagerkrans, 65 Neb. 566, 91 N.V. 358, 363 (1902),
aff'd, 95 N.W. 2 (Sup. Ct. 1903).
1'Jones v. Kansas City So. Ry., 137 La. 173, 68 So. 401 (1915).
131d. at 405.
14 LA. STAT. ANN. art. 2315 (Supp. 1959).
15 Dowell, Inc. v. Jowers, 166 F. 2d 214 (5th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 832
(1949).
16 Smith v. Monroe Grocer Co., 179 So. 495 (La App. 1938).
17 Killian v. Modern Iron Works, 15 So. 2d 532 (La App. 1943).
18 Seither v. Poter, 194 So. 467 (La App. 194).
19 Russell v. Taglialavore, 153 So. 44 (La App. 1934).
20Jones v. Kansas City So. Ry., 143 La. 307, 78 So. 568 (1918).
"I Stephens v. Natchitoches Parish School Bd., 110 So. 2d 156, 164 (La. App. 1959).
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"In the assessment of damages ..

much discretion must be left to the

judge or jury, while in other cases they have none, but are bound to give
such damages .. as will fully indemnify the creditors. '22 Basically then,
damages should equal the loss sustained, and where the damage is certain,
but the pecuniary value of the damages are not, much discretion is left

23
to the trier of fact.
Recently, where the father of the deceased paid numerous bills (such
as hospital and funeral costs) but did not claim against deceased's minor
son, the court held that the "minor child ... [had] not suffered any loss
of these bills, and for this
or been damaged in any way in the amount
24
reason recovery should not be permitted.
It appears that certainly nowhere in the Louisiana Civil Code, or in any
of the cases, is there anything which even borders on the area of suggesting a consideration of the "divorce rate, the percentage of remarriages of widows, particularly to second husbands whose earnings are
greater than those of the first,"' 25 insofar as calculation of "loss of support" is concerned. Rather than allowing it to become a precedant, therefore, it would seem best to treat this "sociological decision" as a derelict
in the stream of law.

Block v. McGuire, 18 La. App. 417 (1866).
23 Duree v. State, 96 So. 2d 854 (La. App. 1957).
22

24

Andrus, Tutrix v. White, 236 La. 28, 33, 106 So. 2d 705, 707 (1958). Contra, Aymond v. Western Union, 151 La. 184, 91 So. 671 (1922), wherein, the parent of a four-

teen year old boy who was not assisting his father in any way, but on the contrary, was
dependent upon him, was awarded $5,000.00.
25

Brown v. Bourg & Sons, Inc., 239 La. 473, 118 So. 2d 891, 895 (1960).

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-ALIMONY DOES NOT
TERMINATE WITH HUSBAND'S DEATH
On July 7, 1937, the plaintiff obtained an absolute divorce from her
husband upon the ground of habitual intemperance. The divorce decree
entered by the court required " 'that the defendant pay to the plaintiff
the sum of $50.00 on the first of each and every month . . . said payments
to continue until the remarriage of said plaintiff or her death. . . .' "I The
plaintiff's ex-husband died May 26, 1954; she made a claim against his estate for alimony payments that accrued subsequent to his death. The
county court disallowed the claim, but the District Court of Cass County,
North Dakota, reversed the county court. In affirming the district court's2 decision, the Supreme Court of North Dakota held that since the statute
1

Stoutland v. Stoutland, 103 N.W. 2d 286, 287 (N.D. 1960).

2

N.D. REv. CODE § 14-0524 (1943).

